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THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY IN 
ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 
Robert Hadley Hall 
In what follows I shall be concerned with Aristotle's 
voluntary/involuntary distinction as it is presented in 
the Nicomachean Ethics. In particular, I will first 
point out that Aristotle has several criteria for making 
the distinction. Second, I will suggest that, despite 
the deficiencies of these criteria, Aristotle does 
offer, though implicitly, an account of the voluntary/ 
involuntary distinction which is correct at least in 
outline. 
I. 
In III. i. Aristotle draws the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction in several ways. Later, in V. viii. , he does 
so again, though somewhat differently. 
The First Criterion. Aristotle's first characterization 
of the voluntary/involuntary distinction seems straight-
forward and uncontroversial. He says: "Those things, 
then, are thought involuntary, which take place under 
compulsion or owing to ignorance . . ." (1110a).1 What 
Aristotle means by "things" here is implied in the. 
previous paragraph: " . . . virtue is concerned with 
passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and 
actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that 
are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity . . . " 
(1109b). Thus: 
Criterion 1: Something is involuntary if £ (a) it is 
either an action or a passion, and (b) 
it takes place either under compulsion 
or owing to ignorance. 
Something is voluntary iff (a) it is either 
an action or a passion, and (b) it takes 
place neither under compulsion nor owing 
to ignorance. 
In 1110b Aristotle defines "compulsory actions": 
"What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? 
We answer that without qualification actions are so 
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when the cause is in the external circumstances and the 
agent contributes nothing." And he goes on to say: 
"The compulsory, then, seems to be that whose moving 
principle is outside, the person compelled contributing 
nothing." Both of these definitions, however, apply to 
actions. Since Aristotle does not provide a definition 
of "compulsory passions," it must be assumed that his 
above definitions apply to passions as well as to 
actions. In lieu of making this assumption, Aristotle's 
definition of the compulsory is incomplete, since we 
need to know what kinds of thing may be compelled in 
order to know what it is to be compelled. 
To say that a cause is "external" to the person or 
"outside" of him is to imply a spatial separation of the 
person and the cause. It seems easy to understand what 
this amounts to in the case of an overt action. To use 
Aristotle's example in the beginning of III. i.: One is 
carried somewhere by other people. The other people, 
then, whose bodies are spatially separate from the one 
person's body, are a cause of his being carried off. 
Yet, more is required for the person to be compelled. 
The compelled person cannot also be a cause of his 
action; he "contributes nothing." In other words, for 
one to be compelled to be carried off, he cannot assist 
in any way those who are carrying him off. For example, 
he cannot hang on. Thus, it seems that for Aristotle: 
Definition 1: A person is compelled by x to do or to 
feel something iff (a) x is spatially 
separate from that person's body, (b) 
x causes that person's action or feeling, 
and (c) that person does not cause his 
action or feeling. 
Regarding the second condition of the involuntary, 
to say that an action takes place "owing to" or "by 
reason of" ignorance is, for Aristotle, to say that one's 
ignorance causes his action. The following passage 
implies this: 
. . . but the term "involuntary" tends to be used 
not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advan-
tage—for it is not mistaken purpose that causes 
involuntary action (it leads rather to wickedness) , 
nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are 
blamed), but ignorance of particulars, i.e. of 
the circumstances of the action and the objects 
with which it is concerned. (1110b) 
Aristotle goes on to specify what these "particulars" 
may be: "A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, 
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what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and 
sometimes also what (e.g. what instrument) he is 
doing it with, and to what end (e.g. he may think his 
act will conduce to someone's safety), and how he is 
doing it (e.g. whether gently or violently)" (1111a). 
He immediately goes on to say that "the man who was 
ignorant of any of these is thought to have acted 
involuntarily," while if he is ignorant of all of 
them, then he is "mad." Thus for Arsitotle: 
Definition 2: A person acts or feels by reason of 
ignorance iff (a) his ignorance causes 
his action or feeling, and (b) his 
ignorance is of some, but not all, 
"particulars." 
Aristotle's remark that ". . .of all these 
( 'particulars' ) no one could be ignorant unless he 
were mad . . . " (1111a), may be taken to imply that the 
man who is "mad" does not act involuntarily by reason 
of ignorance and, consequently, may be understood to be 
a restriction on the scope of the actions and passions 
which could be involuntary. That is, Aristotle indicates 
here that it is not all non-compelled actions (and 
feelings, too) that can be involuntary by reason of 
ignorance , but only those in which the agent could have 
had knowledge of the circumstances of his action. It 
follows that, since one of the circumstances of an 
action includes the aim or consequences of it (see 1111a-
5), any animal incapable of foresight is also incapable 
of involuntary action by reason of ignorance. But, being 
incapable of foresight, it would also be incapable of 
acting voluntarily. The "mad" man, as well as non-
human animals, is such an animal. Hence, Aristotle is 
here restricting the scope of the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction to human animals with a capacity to know 
all of the circumstances of their actions.2 Note, how-
ever, that this restriction does not apply to those 
actions or feelings which are involuntary solely because 
they are compelled, since in this case one's knowledge 
or lack of it is irrelevant to its being involuntary. 
So, the above restriction is also restricted in its 
scope. 
A consequence of the above restriction is that non-
compelled involuntary actions admit of degree of in-
voluntariness. In lllla25 Aristotle implies that child-
ren may act voluntarily. Since they do have some fore-
sight, though not as much as adults, it would seem that 
they are less capable of acting voluntarily or in-
voluntarily by reason of ignorance than are adults. 
When they do act completely voluntarily, knowing all of 
the circumstance of their action which they are capable 
21 
of knowing, they act less voluntarily than another, in 
similar circumstances, but with a greater capacity to 
understand these circumstances. So, in this sense, the 
voluntary/involuntary distinction admits of degree, 
varying directly with the amount of one's capacity to 
know, which itself varies with innate mental abilities 
(compare the human being and the cat or the exceptional 
and the moronic) and with practice (compare the child 
and the adult). 
Problems With The First Criterion. Definition 2 suffers 
from an ambiguity which becomes clear only when Aristotle's 
examples are considered. That is, condition (b) seems 
to mean that what one may be ignorant of when one acts 
by reason of ignorance are particular matters of fact, 
the totality of which constitutes the "circumstances of 
the action." But not all of the examples which Aristotle 
gives of cases of acting by reason of ignorance are 
examples of cases in which one is ignorant of particular 
matters of fact. The relevant passage here is: 
But of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, 
as for instance people say "it slipped out of 
their mouths as they were speaking," or "they 
did not know it was a secret" . . . or a man 
might say he "let it go off when he merely 
wanted to show its working," as the man did with 
the catapult. Again, one might think one's son 
was an enemy, as Merope did, or that a pointed 
spear had a button on it, or that a stone was 
pumice-stone; or one might want to touch a man, 
as people do in sparring, and really wound him. 
(Ulla) 
To fail to know.that "it was a secret," that "one's 
son was (not) an enemy," "that a pointed spear had a 
button on it," or that "a stone was pumice-stone" is 
ignorance in the sense of "failure to make a correct 
identification." One mistakenly identifies this stone 
as pumice-stone. 
But cases in which "it slipped out of their mouths 
as they were speaking," "he 'let it go off when he merely 
wanted to show its working,'" or cases in which one 
"want(s) to touch a man . . . and really wouhd(s) him" 
are all cases in which there is no apparent failure to 
make correct identifications. Rather, these are trans-
parent cases of doing something accidentally. They 
involve a failure in acting according to plan or intention, 
not a failure in thinking. Such cases do, however, in-
volve a kind of ignorance, that which is a failure of 
having knowledge of how to do some particular action. 
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Perhaps Aristotle fails to distinguish these two 
senses of "ignorant" because in both cases the ignorance 
concerns something particular. In "ignorance-that" one 
is ignorance of a particular matter of fact, in the sense 
that he makes a mistake in thinking that it is other than 
it really is. In "ignorance-how" one is ignorant of 
how to do a particular action, in the sense that he 
fails to do the particular action which he intended to 
do. 
Condition (b) in definition 2 obviously requires 
the person who acts involuntarily by reason of ignorance 
to be "ignorant" in the above first sense of the word. 
That is, such a person has "ignorance of particulars, 
i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects 
with which it is concerned" (1110b). It follows that 
certain of Aristotle's examples are ill-chosen. But, 
more importantly, condition (b) raises the problem of 
why actions done accidentally, i.e. contrary to inten-
tion, are excusable. For, if definition 2 is accepted, 
actions done accidentally cannot be excused on the 
ground that they are involuntary actions. But since we 
do, in fact, excuse actions done contrary to intention 
for the reason that they are involuntary, Aristotle's 
definition of acting or feeling by reason of ignorance 
is untenable. 
A more general criticism turns on the sense of "or" 
which is used in the first criterion. It is the ex-
clusive sense of "or." That is, an involuntary action, 
according to the first criterion, cannot both be com-
pelled and done by reason of ignorance. The reason for 
this is simple: if an involuntary action is done by 
reason of ignorance, then one's ignorance is a cause 
of the action; and if one's ignorance is a cause of the 
action, then the person who is ignorant of certain par-
ticulars is a cause of the action; but, if the action is 
compelled, then the person "contributes nothing," does 
not cause the action. To maintain that an involuntary 
action is both compelled and done by reason of ignorance, 
therefore, would be to imply that the person both c a u s e s 
and does not cause the action. It follows, that a 
person cannot be compelled by reason of his ignorance 
of particulars, and that one cannot act by reason of 
ignorance because he is compelled to so act. 
The second consequence, that one cannot act by 
reason of ignorance because one is compelled so to act, 
is false.3 For example, consider the hypnotist who, 
unbeknownst to a subject, places the latter under 
hypnosis. The subject is then instructed to disbelieve, 
after the session, the existence of red lights. As a 
consequence, the following day the subject proceeds to 
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run all the red traffic lights on his way to work. Now 
his action of running the red signals is done by reason 
of ignorance; it is not that he thinks he should run red 
lights that he does so; it is, rather, that he runs them 
because he does not believe that they are really there! 
And he does not believe that they are really there 
because he has been compelled to disbelieve their reality. 
His action of running the red lights is compelled, since 
his ignorance of their reality, which has caused him to 
run them, has been compelled. Yet, such a case could not 
make sense if Aristotle were correct in maintaining that 
involuntary actions may be done either by reason of 
ignorance " or by compulsion, but not both. Yet it is 
perfectly intelligible. 
The upshot of this criticism is, of course, that 
something is mistaken about the first criterion. Either 
definition 1 or definition 2 or both are unacceptable. 
What generates this difficulty, I think, is the 
excessively stringent condition (c) in definition 1, 
i.e. the claim that for an action to be compelled "the 
agent contributes nothing" to it. At least, this is 
paradoxical; at most, it is self-contradictory. For how 
could an agent, qua agent, fail to "contribute" something 
to the action? Since no agent, qua agent, can fail to 
exercise agency, no agent can act involuntarily due to 
compulsion. 
But, perhaps what Aristotle means is that a person, 
who has the capacity to be an agent and is a sometime 
agent, may act involuntarily due to compulsion if, when 
compelled, he is not exercising his capacity to act? 
This in unintelligible. 
More intelligible is the view that Aristotle is 
saying in all compelled actions the person compelled is 
someone who does not act at all, but is acted upon. On 
this interpretation, (c) in definition 1 is to be under-
stood to mean that the person compelled is not the 
efficient cause of the action, though he may be its 
mate rial cause. 
But this view is not consistent with what Aristotle 
says, namely, that one can act under compulsion: "On 
some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon 
is, when one does what he ought not under pressure which 
overstrains human nature and which no one could with-
stand. But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to 
do, but ought rather to face death after the most 
terrible sufferings . . . " (1110a) (see also HlOblO). 
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The problem, then, is that if the compelled person 
acts, he "contributes" something to the involuntary 
action, and there will, in fact, be no involuntary 
actions; but, on the other hand, that the compelled 
person never acts contradicts what Aristotle says above, 
as well as the fact that people do sometimes act under 
compulsion. The solution is that, in some sense, the 
compelled person, at least sometimes, does "contribute" 
something to the involuntary action. 
That a person does "contribute" something even to 
actions which he is compelled to undergo can be recog-
nized easily if we return to Aristotle's example at 
1110a3: Person A is "carried off" by persons B and C. 
Now the mere fact that A is carried off by B and C does 
not excuse A from responsibility for the action. The 
fact that he is carried off by B and C means only that 
the first two conditions in definition 1 are met. At 
this point three alternatives are open to A: (a) the 
"Patty Hearst" alternative: A assists in his being 
carried off, he "hangs on" to B and C; (b) the "Abbie 
Hoffman" alternative: A resists being carried off; (c) 
the "Rosa Parks" alternative: A neither resists being 
carried off, nor does he assist B and C; he simply 
acquieces. But whether A assists B and C, resists them, 
or acquieces to them has an effect on the quality of the 
action of being carried off. That is, if A resists being 
carried off, B and C will not carry him off in the same 
way that they would carry him off if he were to assist 
being carried off or if he were to acquiece. For example, 
there is obviously a great difference between carrying 
off Abbie Hoffman while he is acquiecing, and carrying 
him off while he is resisting. The difference is of the 
same kind as that between striding and shuffling. The 
latter are different ways of doing one kind of action, 
namely walking, and the former are different ways of 
doing another kind of action, carrying. Since A must 
e i t h e r resist, a s s i s t , or acquiece, he will always have 
an i n f l u e n c e on how B and C c a r r y him off. In this 
sense, he will "contribute to" the involuntary action 
which he is compelled to undergo, since a complete de-
scription of a particular action includes a description 
of how i t i s performed. 
Thus, it is just false that "without qualification" 
"the agent (or person) contributes nothing" to compulsory 
actions. Just what qualifications are necessary, how-
ever, do need to be spelled out. And this is precisely 
what Aristotle fails to do. 
The Second Criterion. Another criterion for distinguish-
i n g t h e voluntary from the involuntary is to be found in 
1110a. The crucial p a s s a g e is: 
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But with regard to the things that are done 
from fear of greater evils or for some noble 
object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to 
do something base, having one's parents and 
children in his power, and if one did the action 
they were to be saved, but otherwise be put to 
death) , it may be debated whether such actions 
are involuntary or voluntary. Something of 
the sort happens also with regard to the throw-
ing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the 
abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, 
but on condition of its securing the safety of 
himself and his crew any sensible man does so. 
Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like 
voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice 
at the time when they are done, and an end of an 
action is relative to the occasion. Both the 
terms, then, "voluntary" and "involuntary," 
must be used with reference to the moment of 
action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the 
principle that moves the instrumental parts of 
the body in such actions is in him, and the 
things of which the moving principle is in a 
man himself are in his power to do or not to do. 
Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in 
the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one 
would choose any such act in itself. 
In this passage Aristotle introduces the concept of 
choice into his account of the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction. To say that actions done as means of 
securing a good or "noble object" or as means of pre-
venting an evil greater than the action itself are 
"like voluntary actions, for they are worthy of choice 
at the time when they are done" is to imply that if an 
action is voluntary, then it is worthy of choice. And 
this is to say that being worthy of choice is a neces-. 
sary condition of an action being voluntary. Likewise, 
to say that "such actions" are "perhaps involuntary, 
for no one would choose any such act in itself" is to 
imply that if an action is involuntary, it is such that 
no one would choose it "in itself." And this is to say 
that one's not choosing to do an action "in itself" is 
a necessary condition of an action's being involuntary. 
Thus, in this passage Aristotle seems to add something 
to his analysis of the voluntary/involuntary distinction, 
to the first criterion. So: 
Criterion 2: Something is involuntary iff (a) it is 
either an action or a passion, and (b) 
either (1) it takes place under compul-
sion and would not be chosen to be done 
"in itself" or (2) it takes place owing 
to ignorance and would not be chosen to 
be done "in itself." 
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Something is voluntary iff (a) it is 
either an action or a passion , and 
(b) both CD it takes place not uner 
compulsion and is worthy of choice 
and (2) it takes place not by reason 
of ignorance, i.e. with knowledge, 
and is worthy of choice. 
Problems With The Second Criterion. Firstly, the claim 
that an action which is involuntary is such that it 
would not be chosen to be done "in itself" seems to 
mean that if it is chosen, then it is chosen only as a 
means to something else. Thus, the captain would not 
choose to throw the goods overboard unless he knew 
(or had good reason to believe) that by throwing the 
goods overboard he would effect something nobler or 
less evil than the throwing of the goods overboard, 
namely, in Aristotle's example, the safety of himself 
and his crew. 
Yet, it would also be true of voluntary actions 
that if they are chosen, then they are chosen only as a 
means to something else. The reason is that whatever is 
chosen, for Aristotle, is chosen only as a means to 
something else, an end or a relative end: "We deliberate 
not about ends but about means" (1112b) and "The same 
thing is deliberated on and is chosen" (1113a). Thus, 
that an action is chosen implies that it is chosen only 
as a means certainly does not distinguish voluntary from 
involuntary actions. Hence, if Aristotle is correct in 
what he says about choice, the addition of "and would not 
be chosen to be done in itself" is irrelevant to the 
explanation of the voluntary/involuntary distinction. 
Secondly, the addition of "and is worthy of choice" 
to the analysis of the voluntary plainly vitiates that 
analysis, since not all voluntary actions are worthy of 
choice, which Aristotle clearly admits when he says in 
V. ix. and elsewhere, that "the incontinent man volun-
tarily harms himself" (1136a). 
A more general criticism of this second criterion 
is that its attempt to explain the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction by reference to the concept of choice places 
one in the untenable position of not being able to under-
stand the voluntary and, hence, the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction, until one understands the concept of choice, 
w h i l e , i f A r i s t o t l e i s correct in describing choice as 
e s s e n t i a l l y v o l u n t a r y (III. ii.), one cannot understand 
the concept o f choice u n t i l he first understands the 
voluntary. 
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The Third Criterion. Another way in which Aristotle 
distinguishes the voluntary and.the involuntary is to 
be found in 1110b: 
Everything that is done by reason of ignorance 
is not voluntary; it is only what produces pain 
and repentance that is involuntary. For the man 
who has done something owing to ignorance, and 
feels not the least vexation at his action, has 
not acted voluntarily, since he did not know 
what he was doing, nor yet i n v o l u n t a r i l y , s i n c e 
he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by 
reason of ignorance he who repents is thought 
an involuntary agent, and the man who does not 
repent may, since he is different, be called a 
not voluntary agent; for, since he differs from 
the other, it is better that he should have a 
name of his own. 
In this passage Aristotle is saying that it is a 
necessary condition of an involuntary action done by 
reason of ignorance that the person who does the action 
repents for doing it. Conceiving this as an addition to 
the first criterion, we now have: 
Criterion 3: Something is involuntary iff (a) it is 
either an action or a passion, and (b) 
it takes place either under compulsion 
or by reason of ignorance, and (c) if 
it takes place by reason of ignorance , 
the person who does the action repents 
for doing it. 
Something is voluntary iff (a) it is 
either an action or a passion, and (b) 
it takes place neither under compulsion 
nor by reason of ignorance. 
In the case of the voluntary, since the action does 
not take place by reason of ignorance, the question of 
whether or not the person repents does not arise. So, 
there is no need for a corresponding third condition of 
the voluntary. Aristotle is claiming that whether or 
not the person repents is a question that arises only 
in the cases of certain involuntary actions, those done 
by reason of ignorance, and of what he calls "not 
voluntary" actions. 
The "not voluntary," as Aristotle explains it, is 
distinguished from the involuntary by the fact that in 
"not voluntary" actions the person does not repent for 
them, while in involuntary actions the person does 
repent. The "not voluntary," together with the involun-
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tary, is distinguished from the voluntary by the fact 
that no voluntary actions can be done by reason of ignor-
ance, while all "not voluntary" actions must be done by 
reason of ignorance. The class of "not voluntary" 
actions, therefore, is just a subclass of involuntary 
actions. It follows that the "not voluntary" is not 
contradictive either of the involuntary, its genus, or, 
strictly speaking, of the voluntary, for we cannot infer 
from the falsity of "x is voluntary" to the truth of "x 
is 'not voluntary'" (the action may be compelled). But 
we can infer from the truth of the latter to the falsity 
of the former. An implication of the above is that 
Aristotle is not, in this passage, bringing into dis-
pute the common assumption that if something is either 
an action or a passion, then it is either voluntary or 
involuntary, something that a superficial reading might 
suggest. Rather, he is simply delineating three (not 
two, as delineated in the first two criteria) classes of 
involuntary actions: those which are compelled, those 
which are done by reason of ignorance and not repented, 
and those that are done by reason of ignorance and are 
repented. 
Problems With The Third Criterion. Firstly, this new 
definition of the involuntary is incompatible with 
Aristotle's other claim, made in III. i., that all in-
voluntary actions are excusable. For in order to repent 
for doing an action owing to ignorance, one must not 
only recognize both that one did the action and that one 
did it by reason of ignorance, but, more importantly, one 
must also recognize both that the action is wrong and 
that he is somehow to blame for doing it. That is, if 
either he recognized that the action was not wrong or he 
recognized that he was not to blame, he would not repent. 
And, if he did not recognize that the action was wrong 
or he did not recognize that he was somehow to blame for 
doing it, he would not repent. Thus, from the fact that 
one repents for doing an action, it follows that he is 
to be blamed. And from the fact that he is to be 
blamed it follows that he is not to be excused for doing 
the action. Thus, by the above definition of the invol-
untary, for any involuntary action done by reason of 
ignorance and which is repented, the person who does the 
action is not to be excused. But Aristotle also main-
tains that for any involuntary action, the person who 
does the action is to be excused. Since Aristotle is 
plainly correct in saying that we do excuse all involun-
tary actions , though not all unchosen actions , the above 
definition of the involuntary is unacceptable. 
Secondly, Aristotle's definitions of the involuntary 
and the "not voluntary" are based on the mistaken assump-
tion that the character of an action may be partially 
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determined by the person who does the action after it has 
been accomplished. Yet an action does not become in-
voluntary after it takes place. For to describe an 
action as involuntary is to describe the way in which it 
was performed. And the way in which the action was per-
formed is plainly independent of anyone's present re-
action to it or thought about it. 
It follows, of course, that Aristotle's distinction 
between the three classes of involuntary actions dis-
solves ; what were "not voluntary" actions are now 
eliminated, leaving only compelled and non-compelled 
involuntary actions. 
One's present reactions or psychological states, 
however, may be a key to discovering the character of 
one's past actions. For example, if someone seems to be 
repenting for some past action, we may infer that he 
probably did the action for which he seems to be repent-
ing, that the action was probably voluntary, and that he 
was probably to blame for doing it. In a similar 
fashion, the fact that one seems to remember doing an 
action provides grounds for the claim that he probably 
did the action. Yet, we certainly would not want to 
claim that the action which one appears to remember is 
even partially dependent on his apparent remembering of 
it any more than we would want to claim that the in-
voluntai'iness of an action was even partially dependent 
on one's seeming repentance for it. 
The feeling of pain and repentance for those of 
one's past actions for which one is to be blamed is 
indicative, I think, of the degree of blame which should 
attach to the person. But if he is capable of being 
blamed only for his voluntary actions, the question of 
the voluntariness, or lack of it, of his action needs to 
be answered prior to consideration of the degree of his 
guilt. To insist that one's repentance for his action 
is relevant to its involuntariness is to put the cart 
before the horse. 
It might also be noted that in III. i. Aristotle 
constantly conjoins the notions of pain and repentance 
(see 1110bl7, lllla20, lllla32). It is true that re-
pentance involves pain. But we might distinguish cases 
of involuntary actions about which one later is pained 
from those for which one later seems to repent. For 
instance, a child darts in front of one's car and is 
killed. Here there is no question that one killed the 
child involuntarily (provided that he was not drunk, 
driving recklessly, etc.) as well as that one, if he is 
normal, would feel pain at something so unfortunate. 
30 
But it would certainly not be true that one could repent 
for the action, since this would imply blame and by 
hypothesis, one killed the child involuntarily. Though 
one might feel blameworthy, and so seem to repent, one 
would not actually be blameworthy. Thus, one's_involun-
tary actions may be followed by pain without being 
accompanied by apparent repentance (which involves pain) 
though not by repentance per se. 
The Fourth Criterion. Another criterion of the voluntary/ 
involuntary distinction is to be found in V. viii.: 
By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before, 
any of the things in a man's own power which he 
does with knowledge, i.e. not in ignorance either 
of the person acted on or of the instrument used 
or of the end that will be a t t a i n e d (e.g. whom he 
is striking, with what, and to what end), each 
such act being done not incidentally nor under 
compulsion (e.g. if A takes B's hand and there-
with strikes C, B does not act voluntarily, for 
the act was not in his own power). The person 
struck may be the striker's father, and the 
striker may know that it is a man or one of the 
persons present, but not know that it is his 
father; a similar distinction may be made in 
the case of the end, and with regard to the 
whole action. Therefore that which is done in 
ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is 
not in the agent's power, or is done under 
compulsion, is involuntary (for many natural 
processes, even, we knowingly both perform 
and e x p e r i e n c e , none of which is either volun-
tary or involuntary; e.g. growing old or dying). 
(1135ab) 
The phrase "as has been said before" W. D. Ross 
takes to be a reference to III. i. But, as I have shown, 
III. i. contains three different criteria of the volun-
tary/involuntary distinction. Although Aristotle does 
here repeat part of what he said there, he also adds 
something and appears to subtract something from what 
he said. 
In the above passage Aristotle speaks of voluntary 
actions as being done "with knowledge, i.e. not in 
ignornace . . . ." Yet, in III. i. he speaks of volun-
tary actions as being done "with knowledge," meaning 
there "not by reason of ignorance . . . ." In both 
instances the ignorance relates to "particulars." But 
in III. i. Aristotle distinguishes between actions done 
in ignorance and those done by reason of ignorance: 
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"Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different 
from acting in ignorance; for the man who is drunk or in 
a rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance 
but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not knowingly 
but in ignorance" (1110b). Although Aristotle does not 
spell out in detail this distinction, it is clear from 
what he says here that one may act in ignorance without 
acting by reason of ignorance. That is, while drunk one 
acts in ignorance, though the cause of the drunk's 
action is his being drunk, not necessarily his ignorance. 
However, his ignorance of a "particular," say, of the 
fact that he is drinking a 100 proof beverage, may be 
the cause of his becoming drunk, in which case his actions 
while drunk would be actions done both in ignoracne and 
by reason of ignorance (as well as by reason of drunk-
eness). Further, it would not seem possible to act by 
reason of ignorance without also acting in ignorance. 
That is, if his ignorance of a particular is a cause of 
his action and if he does complete the action, then it 
would seem to be true that while performing the action 
he remains ignorant of that particular. Thus, one need 
not be drunk or in a rage to act in ignorance. Aristotle 
simply uses these extreme cases to bring out the dif-
ference between acting in ignorance and acting by reason 
of ignorance. In any case, as long as it is granted 
that acting in ignorance is something quite different 
from acting by reason of ignorance, it is clear that 
Aristotle's definition of the voluntary, put forth above, 
is different from his other definitions of the voluntary 
which h a v e been c o n s i d e r e d thus f a r . 
Another difference between Aristotle's above 
definition of the voluntary and those definitions 
previously considered is indicated by the phrase "in 
a man's own power."5 Aristotle is claiming that in 
o r d e r for someone's action to be voluntary, it must be 
"in his power" to do the a c t i o n . This is i n d i c a t e d by 
the first sentence in the above quote. Of course, being 
in one's power to do an action is not sufficient for the 
action to be voluntary. This Aristotle brings out in the 
last s e n t e n c e : g r o w i n g old is in one's power to do, yet 
it is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But failing to 
be in one's power to do an action is regarded as suf-
ficient for the action to be involuntary, as the last 
sentence also i n d i c a t e d , provided, of course, that the 
a c t i o n does t a k e place. 
I think, therefore, that Aristotle's fourth criterion 
for distinguishing the voluntary and the involuntary may 
be set out thus: 
Criterion 4: Something is involuntary iff (a) it is 
e i t h e r an a c t i o n o r a passion, and (b) 
it takes p l a c e i n i g n o r a n c e o r i t takes 
p l a c e under compulsion o r i t i s n o t i n 
one's power. 
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Something is voluntary iff (a) it is 
either an action or a passion, (b) it 
does not take place in ignorance and 
it is not compelled, and Cc) it is in 
one's power. 
Problems With The Fourth Criterion. Firstly, if "it is 
in one' s power75 Ts understood as meaning the same as 
"one is capable of doing it," which is the most obvious 
way of understanding that phrase and which is the way 
Aristotle seems to understand it in III. iii. , i.e. in 
his discussion of choice, then to say that the voluntary 
is in one's power is not to add anything to the under-
standing of the voluntary. The reason is that being in 
one's power is a presupposition of doing an action or of 
feeling a passion, regardless of whether that action or 
passion is voluntary. That is, of course, it follows 
from the fact that one has done an action that one was 
capable of doing it. And, as obviously, it follows from 
the fact that one has done an action voluntarily that 
one was capable of doing it. And this follows, not be-
cause one's action was voluntary, but because it was one's 
action. Thus, "it is in one's power" is explicative of 
"one's doing an action," but not of the voluntary. It 
is, therefore superfluous to the definition of the 
voluntary. 
Secondly, in the case of Aristotle's definition of 
the involuntary "it is not in one's power" is a condition 
which contradicts a presupposition of the involuntary. 
That is, either one does or one fails to do an involun-
tary action which is involuntary because it is not in 
one's power. Suppose one does such an action. Then, 
one does something of which he is incapable. Hence, one 
cannot help but fail to do involuntary actions which are 
involuntary because they are not in one's power. But 
Aristotle's entire discussion of the involuntary pre-
supposes, correctly, that one can act involuntarily. 
There is, furthermore, no point in discussing the in-
voluntary with a view of discovering at least part of 
the class of things pardonable if one is never excused 
on the grounds of doing something involuntarily. And 
one is never pardoned on the grounds that his action was 
involuntary because he was incapable of doing it. 
Finally, that an action takes place in ignorance is 
clearly not sufficient ground for the claim that it takes 
place involuntarily. Recall that, in Aristotle's own 
example, the drunk acts in ignorance. Yet, we need to 
know more than this in order to know that the drunk acts 
involuntarily: we need to know how it was that he got 
drunk in the first place. For if he voluntarily gets 
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drunk, his actions while drunk are voluntary and he is 
accordingly held to be responsible for his actions. But 
if he involuntarily gets drunk, his actions while drunk 
are involuntary and he is excused from responsibility 
for them. So, in order to determine whether the drunk's 
actions really are involuntary, we need to know something 
about the cause of his getting drunk. Generalizing, we 
need to know something about the cause of an action done 
in ignorance in order to know whether it is involuntary. 
So, the mere fact that one acts in ignorance is not a 
sufficient condition for the claim that he acts in-
voluntarily. . 
States Of Character As Voluntary. It has been noticed 
that, in the beginning of III. lii. , Aristotle limits 
the voluntary and the involuntary to the class of things 
which are either actions or passions: unless something 
is either an action or a passion, 'it cannot be either 
voluntary or involuntary. But toward the end of III. v. 
Aristotle is willing to describe states of character as 
voluntary. He says: 
With regard to the virtues in general we have 
stated their genus in outline, viz. that they 
are means and that they are states of character, 
and that they tend, and by their own nature, 
to the doing of the acts by which they are 
produced, and that they are in our power and 
voluntary, and act as the right rule prescribes. 
But actions and states of character are not 
voluntary in the same way, for we are masters 
of our actions from the beginning right to the 
end, if we know the particular facts, but though 
we control the beginning of our states of charac-
ter the gradual progress is not obvious , any more 
than it is in illnesses; because it was in our 
power, however, to act in this way or not in this 
way, therefore the states are voluntary. (1114b-
1115a) 
The description of states of character--by which, 
it is clear from III. v. , Aristotle means both virtues 
and vices both of the body and of the soul—as voluntary 
does not contradict the first condition of any of the 
criteria of the voluntary set forth above. That is, 
states of character, Aristotle is saying, are voluntary 
solely because they are the result of a series of actions. 
We could say that, for Aristotle, actions and passions 
are voluntary in a primary way. and that what they, either 
singly or collectively, cause or result in are voluntary 
in a secondary way, i.e. voluntary solely because they 
are caused by something which is voluntary. For example, 
one's voluntarily slamming the door causes its window to 
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break. In this case, one's action of slamming the door 
is voluntary, but not because it is caused by something 
else which is voluntary. It is voluntary in a primary 
way. But one's action of breaking the window is also 
voluntary, but only because it is caused by one's volun-
tarily slamming the door. It is voluntary in a secondary 
way. In a similar fashion, one's habit of slamming doors 
or one's character as a door-slammer is not voluntary in 
a primary way. But because, in this case, it is the 
result of not a single action, but a series of similar 
actions (of voluntarily slamming many doors), it is 
voluntary only in a secondary way. Thus, on this in-
terpretation, we may understand Aristotle as holding 
the following two principles: 
(1) Whatever single action or passion is the result of 
another action or passion, which itself is voluntary, 
is voluntary in a secondary way. 
(2) Whatever state of character, virtue or vice, is the 
result of a series of actions or passions , each 
member of which is voluntary, is voluntary in a 
secondary way. 
Then what is voluntary in the primary way is voluntary 
because it conforms to an adequate criterion of the . 
voluntary, which would include the condition that what 
is voluntary is either an action or a passion. 
Notice, though, that although one may replace 
"voluntary" with "involuntary" in (1) and be consistent 
with Aristotle, one may not replace "voluntary" with 
"involuntary" in (2) and remain consistent with Aristotle. 
That is, Aristotle agrees that if, for example, A takes 
B's hand and with it slams the door, B involuntarily 
slams the door; and if the slamming results in the door's 
window being broken, then B broke the window involuntar-
ily. But Aristotle cannot agree with the second re-
placement. For Aristotle there could not be a state of 
character which is involuntary because it is the result 
of a series of actions or passions each member of which 
is involuntary. The reason for this is that a State of 
character is a disposition to choose and is the result 
both of doing a number of actions of a certain type and 
of choosing to do them. Even if, say, A forces B to 
slam every door which B has an opportunity to slam, this 
does not cause B to become a door-slammer, to have door-
slamming as a state of character. Rather, to become a 
door-slammer B must choose to slam most or many of the 
doors which he has an opportunity to slam. So, in order 
for one's actions or passions to result in the develop-
ment of a state of character one must choose them. But 
one cannot choose them unless one chooses them voluntar-
ily: "Choice, then, seems to be voluntary" (1111b). 
35 
Thus, it is not possible for a series of involuntary 
actions or passions to result in a state of character, 
and, therefore, in an involuntary state of character. 
Aristotle's motive for maintaining that states of 
character are never involuntary is reasonably clear: If 
they could be involuntary, then those with undesirable 
states of character, e.g. the unjust and the self-
indulgent man, could not be held responsible for them 
and, consequently, could not be blamed. But Aristotle 
wants to insist that persons, regardless of their 
characters, are responsible for the kind of people that 
they are. Thus, although particular actions and passions 
may be voluntary or involuntary, states of character may 
be voluntary only. The main point, however, is that 
analysis of voluntary states of character is of little 
value in discovering what is voluntary in a primary 
way, since states of character are voluntary only in a 
secondary way. 
Toward Adequate Definitions Of The Voluntary And Of The 
Involuntary. So far, Aristotle has put forward several 
alleged necessary conditions of. the voluntary and of the 
involuntary. These were, in the case of the voluntary, 
(1) that it is either an action or.a passion, (2) that 
it takes place neither under compulsion nor owing to 
ignorance, (3) that it is worthy of choice, (4) that it 
does not take place in ignorance, and (5) that it is in 
one's power. I have argued that the definition which 
A r i s t o t l e gives of the compulsory is inadequate, that 
(3) and (4) are not really necessary conditions of the 
voluntary, and that (5) is a superfluous condition. In 
the case of the involuntary, these were (1) that it is 
either an action or a passion, (2) that it takes place 
either under compulsion or owing to ignorance, (3) that 
it would not be chosen to be done "in itself," (4) that 
if it takes place by reason of ignorance, the person who. 
does the action or feels the passion repents for doing 
it or for feeling it, and (5) that it takes place in 
ignorance or under compulsion or it is not in one's 
power. I have argued that the definition which A r i s t o t l e 
gives of "under compulsion" is not adequate, that (3) is 
irrelevant to a definition of the involuntary, that (4) 
is not a necessary condition of the involuntary, that 
its taking place in ignorance is not a sufficient condi-
tion of the involuntary, and that its failing to be in 
one's power is not a necessary condition of the involun-
tary . 
Of all these conditions, the most accurate are the 
first two pair: that the voluntary is either an action 
or a passion and that it takes place neither under 
compulsion nor by reason of ignorance, and that the 
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involuntary is either an action or a passion and that 
it takes place either under compulsion or owing to 
ignorance. These are the most accurate, but because of 
the inadequacy of Aristotle's definition of the com-
pulsory, they are not accurate enough. Aristotle is 
right in outline, but wrong in the details. 
Nevertheless, in spite of his explicit definition, 
Aristotle does hint at a clearer way of defining "under 
compulsion." He says: "But actions and states of 
character are not voluntary in the same way; for we are 
masters of our actions from the beginning right to the 
end, if we know the particular facts, but though we 
control the beginning of our states of character the 
gradual progress is not obvious . . . " (1114b-1115a)'. 
The key terms here are "masters" and "control." It 
is my c o n t e n t i o n that we can better understand the 
voluntary and the involuntary in terms of the concept 
of control. The reason for this is that by reference 
to the concept of control we can better understand the 
phrase "under compulsion." 
Control And Compulsion. Recall that Aristotle's defini-
tion of compulsion relies on the concept of the spatial 
separation of what compels and what is compelled as well 
as on the concept of a cause, what compels is a cause 
and what is compelled is not a cause. In the criticism 
of this definition it was noticed that what is compelled 
is also a cause: whether A assists, resists, or acquiesces 
in being carried of by B and C has an influence on B and 
C's carrying him off. Thus, when A resists being carried 
off, then, assuming he is carried off, he is both com-
pelled and a cause of the compelled action. 
The concept of control, however, does not presuppose 
that of the spatial separation of what controls and what 
is controlled. Neither does it presuppose in the same 
way the concept of cause. What controls is a cause, but 
what is controlled is also a cause. In particular, 
suppose that A is carried off by B and C and that A 
resists being carried off. A, then, is compelled by B • 
and C. A's being carried off, however, is not controll-
ed by A. By his resistance A attempts to control the 
situation, but he fails. Nevertheless, he remains a 
cause of his being carried off, for his very resistance 
influences the action of his being carried off. B and 
C are also a cause of A's being carried off. Thus, A, 
what la compelled, is not distinguished from B and C, 
what compels, on the ground that A is not, while B and 
C are, a cause of A's being carried off. But, since A 
does not control his being carried off, while B and C 
do control his being carried off, what is compelled may 
be distinguished from what compels on the ground that 
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the latter, and not the former, also controls. That the 
concept of control does not presuppose a spatial separa-
tion of what is controlled and what controls is obvious 
from the fact that one may exercize control over his own 
actions and feelings. Yet, we would not want to maintain 
that one is spatially separate from his own actions or 
feelings. 
I think, then, that a more accurate definition of 
"being compelled" is: 
Definition 1': A person is compelled by x to do or 
feel something iff (a) x controls 
that person's action or feeling, and 
(b) that person does not control his 
action or feeling. 
Here "x" may be replaced by any term signifying something 
which is capable of exercizing control, from "John Doe" 
to "the wind." "Control" is here understood to mean 
the same as "direct." Thus, B and C control A's activity 
to the extent that they direct or guide it. When B and 
C share in directing A's activity or when A alone 
directs his activity, it is not compelled. 
One virtue of this definition of the compulsory, 
aside from its simplicity, is that it provides another 
way of interpreting certain of the puzzling expressions 
toward the beginning of Book III. There Aristotle says: 
" . . . that is compulsory of which t h e moving p r i n c i p l e 
is outside, being a principle in which nothing is con-
tributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the 
passion . . . " (1110a). And, again, "Now the man acts 
voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental 
parts of the body in such actions is in him . . ." (1110a). 
In view of the above definition we may say that "when 
compelled 'the moving principle is outside' and not 
'inside' the person" is just a vague way of saying that 
when compelled, something else and not the person him-
self controls his activity or feeling. 
Further, unlike the previous definition of the 
compulsory, the above definition is neutral with respect 
to the question of whether one may be compelled by the 
gods, spirits generally, other minds, and the like. For 
according to the previous, unsatisfactory, definition 
such questions are ruled out from the start: what com-
pels is spatially distinct from what is compelled. 
The above definition also enables us to understand 
why actions done accidentally, i.e. contrary to inten-
tion, are involuntary. Recall that members of this class 
of a c t i o n s were i n s t a n c e s o f failing t o know how to do 
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something in particular. For example, " . . . one might 
want to touch a man, as people do in sparring, and really 
wound him . . . " (1111a). In this example the person who 
wounds the other man wounds him because he fails to 
exercise control over his own physical activity. Gen-
eralizing, failure to have control is a mark of actions 
done contrary to intention. Since such actions must be 
directed by something else, they are rightly characterized 
as involuntary. Similar remarks apply, of course, in the 
case of actions done "accidentally" in the sense of "non-
intentionally." 
Control And "By Reason Of Ignorance." Besides aiding 
xn the understanding of the compulsory, the concept of 
control bears some relation to the notion of acting or 
feeling by reason of ignorance. Recall that in the 
quote in which A r i s t o t l e hints at defining the compulsory 
in terms of the concept of control he says: " . . . for 
we are masters of our actions from the beginning right 
to the end, if we know the particular facts . . . ." 
If we think of "the particular facts" as a reference to 
the circumstances of an action, as previously specified 
by Aristotle, then Aristotle is saying here that one's 
not being ignorant of the "particulars" is a sufficient 
condition for one's being in control of an action. Now 
those involuntary actions which are involuntary due to 
compulsion fall into two classes: those actions which 
one undergoes, such as being carried off, and those 
actions which one does , such as accidentally wounding 
another. Knowledge of the particular facts is h a r d l y a 
sufficient condition for not acting involuntarily due to 
being compelled to undergo an action. A's knowledge of 
the particular facts is compatible with B and C carrying 
him off. But neither is knowledge of the particular 
facts sufficient for not acting involuntarily due to 
being compelled to do an action. That is, knowledge of 
the particular facts is not sufficient for being in 
control of an action which a person does, rather than 
one which he undergoes. For one's knowledge of the 
circumstances of the action is compatible with doing the 
action accidentally. In this case one's lack of k n o w l e d g e -
how, not his lack of knowledge-that, is the source of his 
failure to control the action. The class of actions for 
which one's knowledge of the particular facts is sufficient 
for being in control, therefore, is narrowed to those 
actions which one does and which one does non-accidental-
ly , i.e. intentionally. That is, when one is fully 
acquainted with the circumstances of an action which he 
does intentionally, he is in control of the action. The 
reason for this is that knowledge of the circumstances 
of the intentional action includes knowledge of how to 
c a r r y out one's intention in the particular case. For 
instance, one intentionally wounds his sparring partner. 
One's knowledge of the circumstances of the action 
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includes knowledge of how to wound his sparring partner 
in this particular instance. That is, he knows " . . . 
what he is doing, what or with whom he is acting on, 
and . . . what . . . he is doing it with, and to what 
end . . . and how he is doing it" (1111a). Knowing 
these particulars and his intention, one will also know 
how to carry out his intention. Knowledge of the par-
ticular facts is also necessary for being in control of 
one's non-accidental actions. One cannot act from his 
intentions in the particular case unless he is fully 
acquainted with the circumstances of the action. 
Thus, knowledge of the circumstances of one's non-
accidental action is both necessary and sufficient for 
one's being a "master" of his action. And knowledge of 
-the circumstances of one's accidental actions, whether 
unintentional or contrary to intention, is not sufficient 
for one's being a master of his actions. Neither, 
obviously is it a necessary condition. Thus, the only 
actions of which one can be a master are those which he 
does, rather than undergoes, non-accidentally. Non-
accidental actions, again, cannot take place by reason 
of ignorance, for they do not take place in ignorance 
of the particular circumstances. Hence, given that one 
is a master of an action, is in control, it follows 
that the action does not take place by reason of 
ignorance. So, from the fact that one controls an action 
it follows both that he is not compelled and that he does 
not do the action by reason of ignorance. 
Aristotle's Implicit Definitions Of The Voluntary And Of 
The Involuntary. IT we take the hint which Aristotle 
gives us in 1114b-1115a and think of the voluntary/ 
involuntary distinction in terms of the concept of con-
trol, we end up with a reasonably clear and simple way 
of making the distinction, a more clear and simpler way 
of making it than that afforded by the foregoing explicit 
criteria. This implicit account, then , is : 
Something is involuntary iff (a) it is either an 
action or a passion , 
and(b) the person who 
does the action or feels 
the passion is not in 
control of the action 
or passion. 
Something is v o l u n t a r y iff (a) it is e i t h e r an 
action or a passion, 
and (b) the person 
who does the action 
or feels the passion, 
is in control of the 
action or passion. 
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The "or takes place by reason of ignorance" and "or 
does not take place by reason of ignorance" conditions of 
the first criterion may now be dropped. For the above 
definition of "being compelled" renders them super-
fluous. That is, on the side of the involuntary, if one 
is not in control of an action which he undergoes, then 
the question of whether he did the action by reason of 
ignorance cannot arise. If, on the other hand, he is 
not in control of an action which he did, then something 
else is in control of it; then, he is compelled. Given 
that he is compelled, we do not need to know whether his 
action took place by reason of ignorance in order to 
know that it was involuntary. .On the side of the volun-
tary, if one is in control of his action, which, there-
fore, is not compelled, then he cannot possibly act by 
reason of ignorance. It is, in other words, contra-
dictory to suppose that one is not compelled to do an 
action but nevertheless does it by reason of ignorance. 
For if he is not compelled to do the action, and he does 
it, he is in control of his action. And one is master 
only of those actions which he does with knowledge. 
The tenability of this implicit criterion rests 
squarely on the adequacy of the concept of control. To 
further this analysis somewhat, as well as to see how 
this criterion is useful in deciding problem cases, con-
sider the problem case which Aristotle mentions at the 
beginning of III. i.: " . . . it may be debated whether 
such actions are voluntary or involuntary. Something of 
the sort also happens with regard to the throwing of 
goods overboard in a storm . . . on condition of its 
securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible 
man does so" (1110a). To ask whether the action of dis-
carding the goods overboard was voluntary is to ask what 
controlled the action. If to control is to direct or 
guide something, then it was voluntary for the captain, 
since it was he who directed that the goods be discarded. 
It was also voluntary for the crewmen who actually did 
the discarding for they certainly directed their bodily 
actions, even though their only reason for acting may 
have been to obey the c a p t a i n . Since in the absence of 
the storm or other threat to their safety the captain 
would not have issued his command, the presence of the 
threat guided his decision, though it did not guide or 
direct it in the same way in which he guided or directed 
the activity of discarding the goods overboard. Rather, 
it guided the action of the captain by presenting him with 
a good reason to act. Thus, the storm, the crewmen, and 
the captain all had a hand in the discarding of the goods. 
The action, t h e r e f o r e , could not have been involuntary 
for the captain, since he had some control over the 
action, though not, of course, over his being presented 
with a good reason to act. For i t to have been involun-
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tary for the captain, he could not have had any control; 
he would have to have done it accidentally or to have 
been used literally as a tool by something else. The 
resolution of this problematic case certainly illustrates, 
I think, the need for a further analysis of the concept 
of control. 
I think, then, that a more adequate criterion of 
the voluntary/involuntary distinction can be found in 
Aristotle's work than in the first four attempts on 
which attention has been focused typically. The analysis 
of this implicit criterion does, however, remain at the 
level of common sense. In any case, the adequacy and 
consistency of Aristotle's voluntary/involuntary dis-
tinction, as he makes it implicitly, do need to be further 
examined vis-a-vis his accounts of moral choice and moral 
culpability. 
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NOTES 
1I am using the V/. D. Ross translation from The 
Basic Works of Aristotle, R. McKeon, ed. 
2 . 
Nevertheless, lllla26 raises a problem with this, 
for Aristotle implies that non-human animals can act 
voluntarily. 
3 
I think it can be shown also that the first 
consequence is false. 
4 
It might be urged that, just as there is a 
strong and a weak sense of "remember," according to the 
former of which "I remember doing a" implies "I did do 
a" and according to the latter' of which "I remember 
doing a" does not imply "I did do a," there is a strong 
and weak sense of "repent," according to the former 
of which the implications drawn in this paragraph, and 
those subsequent, do hold and according to the latter of 
which these implications do not hold; that, consequently, 
Aristotle is not inconsistent. 
^Although this phrase also occurs in the passage fro 
which I took the second, criterion, it is more convenient 
to consider it here. 
